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informed or the uniformed party is chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. This
allows to account for the simultaneous presence of signaling and screening. Moreover,
thepossibilitytodissolvematchesunsuccessfullyallowstoendogenizethedistribution
of types in the market. It will be shown that this approach overcomes the well-known
trade-off between ensuring existence (in signaling games) and obtaining clear-cut re-
sults (in screening games).
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The analysis of markets with adverse selection has attracted much attention during the last
three decades. Given the prevalence of private information in many real world settings such
as insurance, labor markets, or investor-bank relationships, this seems justified. On the other
side, it is fair to say that there exists no commonly accepted notion of competitive equilibrium
in markets with adverse selection. This holds even if we restrict attention to contributions in
the literature which, in the words of Gale (1996), emphasize the non-cooperative nature of
equilibrium.1
To fix ideas, consider a labor market where workers have private information about their
productivity type. A labor contract signed between a single firm and a single worker specifies
a wage and additionally a sorting variable such as training or working hours. (The worker’s
payoff satisfies a standard sorting (or single crossing) condition in this variable.) Moreover,
assume that firms compete for workers as they constitute the long side of the market. There
exist two canonical approaches to analyze this setting. The most prominent approach is to
consider a two-stage screening game. At the first stage, the uninformed agents, i.e. firms,
simultaneously offer a menu of contracts. At the second stage, workers pick an individual firm
and sign a contract.2 It turns out that equilibriumcontracts are unique and separating. However,
as found by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), an equilibrium in pure strategies may fail to exist.3
A different approach is to consider a game of signaling where the informed party proposes a
contract. Thoughcontractualgamesofsignalinghavebeenpredominantlyanalyzedforbilateral
monopolies,4 the analysis of the two-stage game in a frictionless market is identical.5 Though
existence is no longer an issue, signaling games are plagued with a multiplicity of equilibria.
Fromthisbriefoverviewofexistingnon-cooperativemodels,thefollowingdrawbacksemerge.
First, the outcome is very sensitive to the choice of the game, i.e. to the sequence of moves.
4 As we restrict ourselves to the non-cooperative strand of the literature, we refer the reader to Gale (1996) for
a list of alternative approaches.
5 The standard approach is to assume that competing firms have unlimited capacities (or vacancies). Only re-
cently, Inderst and Wambach (1999a, 1999b) have analyzed the case where capacities are constrained. We should
note that this makes no difference if workers can visit firms without costs. In contrast, if it is costly to be ra-
tioned as visiting another firm entails search costs, the non-existence problem of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
disappears.
6 In response to the non-existence problem, Wilson (1977) and Riley (1979) have proposed alternative solution
concepts. These concepts can be given a game-theoretic foundation by extending the original two-stage game.
Hellwig (1987) summarizes several attempts in this direction.
7 For an overview see Kreps and Sobel (1994).
8 To our knowledge, the only attempt to embed signaling games in a market enviroment with frictions is Inderst
(1999).
2Hellwig (1987) notes that this discrepancy between the predictions in models of screening and
signaling presents a fundamental dilemma for applied economists. While the order in which
people move is crucial for the predictions, it may not be observable and may not even be fixed
in a given market. Second, each approach has its own serious problems. While the screening
approach suffers from the problem of non-existence, the signaling approach fails to make clear
predictionsasthereexistmultipleequilibriawithhighlydifferentoutcomes. Thirdly, thepicture
of a frictionless market which is assumed in either setting is surely an abstraction from reality.
In fact, in settings withcomplete information, the issue howto modeldecentralizedmarkets has
been addressed in the literature on matching and search markets (see the overview in McMillan
and Rothschild (1994)).
The model presented in this paper intends to overcome all three drawbacks of the existing
approaches. Hence, we will allow for the simultaneous presence of both signaling and screen-
ing. Moreover, weexplicitlyintroducefrictionsbyembeddingtherespectivecontractualgames
in a matching market environment. The approach will allow to derive clear-cut results regard-
ing the equilibrium allocation (of contracts), while preserving existence. Additionally, it allows
to address issues which could not be analyzed previously such as the endogenization of the
distribution of types in the market.
To fix ideas, we stick to the picture of the labor market. We assume that each firm has a
single vacancy and that each job seeker can work for at most one firm. Moreover, we consider
a stationary environment where each moment (in discrete time) a fixed measure of potential
employers and employees appear on the market fringe and may decide to enter the market. To
simplify the analysis, we restrict attention to the case where potential employers outnumber
potential employees. This is formally equivalent to a zero-profit condition for firms and is
surely reasonable in the labor market context. In the market individuals are pairwise matched.
In a given match a party is chosen randomly to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Hence, if the
firm makes the proposal, we encounter a game of screening. Otherwise, the parties play a
game of signaling. If the offer is rejected, the match is dissolved and the two parties reenter
the market. Waiting to be matched anew is costly. We are mainly interested in the case where
frictions become arbitrarily small.
If we require that the market size remains bounded as frictions vanish, we can derive the
following main results of the paper. First, we show that equilibrium contracts converge to a
uniquely defined set of least-cost-separating contracts as frictions vanish. Hence, the unique-
ness result of the standard screening approach is preserved in the matching market. Secondly,
3focusing again on low frictions, we can establish existence. The key to the existence result
is that the matching market environment allows to endogenize the distribution of types in the
market. To our knowledge, the possibility that variations in the circulation time of different
types are used to endogenize the distribution is new to the literature on markets with adverse
selection.6
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. Section
3 derives the convergence result, while Section 4 addresses existence. In Section 5 we discuss
equilibria where the stock of agents in the market grows beyond any boundary as frictions
disappear. Intheseequilibriatheefficiencygainsfromadecreaseinfrictionsarealmostentirely
offset by longer waiting times for firms or low-type workers who crowd the market. Section 6
concludes with a discussion of alternative models for the contractual game in a match. Some
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. The Model
2.1 Players and Payoffs
The market consists of firms which have a single vacancy to fill and of potential workers who
may work for at most one firm. A worker has private information about his type denoted by a




with finite :. Firms assign probability >E : f to type
 5 U with
S
MU >E' . Aworkerandafirmcanconcludeacontractspecifyingtwovariables
|c+,w h e r e| is a monetary transfer, while +  f is real valued and may denote, for instance,
the number of hours worked. We abbreviate a contract by S 'E |c+ with S 5  ' ??
n
f .
Denote the firm’s utility under a contractS with type  by LEcS and the utility of the worker by
T EcS. Observe that both utilities depend on the worker’s type. If a vacancy remains unfilled,
the firm’s utility is denoted by Lf. Similarly, if the worker is not successful, his reservation
value is denoted by T f, which is assumed to be type-independent.
We make next a series of restrictions on the payoff functions. First, we restrict attention to
the case with transferable utility where T EcS'Ec+n| and LEcS'Ec+  |.7 The
9 Thisseemsreminiscenttoresultsderivedintherecentliteratureondecentralizedmarketswithnon-transferable
utility (see Burdett and Coles (1998)). The speed with which different types leave the market depends on the
acceptance behavior of their respective matching partners, which again depends on the aggregate distribution of
potential partners in the population. This mutual dependency allows for multiple equilibria. The possibility to
adjust the distribution of circulating agents has also been used in the axiomatic setting of Myerson (1995).
: The main convergence result of this paper is generalized to the case with non-transferable utility in the working
paper version (see Inderst (1999c)).
4functions Ec and Ec are twice continuously differentiable. Define the surplus function
rEc+'Ec+nEc+. We invoke the following assumptions.
(A.1) rEc+ is strictly quasiconcave; ,6+<"_rEc+*_+ 	 f.
(A.2) _Ec+*_+ : _Ec+*_+ for all :
(A.3) Ec+ : Ec+ for :and +:f8
Observe first that (A.1) admits in particular the case where rEcis linear and strictly de-
creasing in +. We will frequently use this case as an example. (A.2) is standard in problems
of screening of this sort. By _Ec+*_+ : _Ec+*_+ for +:f and :the contractual
component + is a sorting variable as the worker’s payoff satisfies a standard sorting condition
with respect to this variable. Finally, by (A.3) firms prefer to conclude a given contract with a
higher type.
Before illustrating (A.1)-(A.3) with two examples, consider for any type  the program to
maximize T EcS subject to S 5  and LEcS  Lf. By (A.1) a unique solution exists, which
is denoted by SWE.
Examples
- The Spence case: We specify T EcS'|  +*@ and LEcS'@  | for  5 U,w h e r e
@ :@  : ffor: . Observethatthesortingvariableispurelydissipativesuchthat +WE'f
for all  5 U. A standard example is education or some non-related training, which better types
can manage with less effort and thus less disutility.
-Workinghours: Assumethat+ representshoursofwork. Ahightypeismoreeagertowork,
i.e. he incurs less disutility from working additional hours, and he is also more productive
both absolutely from (A.3) and on the margin as we assume additionally that _Ec+*_+ :
_Ec+*_+ for: .9 Ifweassumethat_rEc+*_+ : fat+ 'f ,weobtain+WE :+ WE : f
for all : .
Below we will consider a matching market with endogenous entry. To ensure that workers
of all types enter if frictions are low, their respective payoff must exceed T f regardless of the
firms’ beliefs. The following assumption, which is particularly reasonable in the considered
context of a labor market, proves to be sufficient for this purpose.
; In the working paper version (Inderst (1999c)) we also consider the case where gy+m>|,@g| A gy+l>|,@g| in
(A.2) holds only almost everywhere, which admits gy+m>|,@g| @ gy+l>|,@g| @3at | @3 .
< Hence,therankingofthemarginaltrade-offsbetweentypesissimilarforworkersandfirms. Intheterminology
of Beaudry and Poitevin (1993) this represents the ‘‘S case’’, which they distinguish from the ‘‘RS case’’ (e.g.
insurance contracts).
5(A.4) T EcS WE :Tf and T EcS  T EcS for all S 5 , : .
2.2 Market
We consider a matching market with endogenous entry.10 Time runs discretely and the market
operates for an infinite number of periods. All agents discount future payoffs by a constant
discount factor f 	B	. The primitives of the model are the time invariant measures of
agents newly arriving on the market fringe each period. For instance, we may suppose that each
period there is a new cohort of job applicants and firms. We denote the respective finite masses
by 8f : f for firms and by `fE : f for workers of type  5 U. Denote `f '
S
MU `fE
and >fE'`fE*`f. Our main assumption on the primitives is that firms constitute the
longer side on the market fringe.
(A.5) 8f :` f
Technically, this assumption could be replaced by a zero-profit condition for firms as it will
imply that firms realize exactly their reservation utility Lf in the market.
In what follows, we will restrict attention to stationary markets where the measures of stocks
as well as that of agents exiting and entering are time invariant. We denote the stock of firms
by 8 and that of workers of type  by `E. The aggregate stock of workers equals ` '
S
MU `E. For `:f the distribution in the market is given by >E'`E*`.L e t.8 be
the measure of entering firms and .`E that of entering workers of type . The measures of
exits are denoted by f8 and f`E.
The matching market operates as follows. We consider an anonymous market with random
matching and a proportional matching technology.11 In this case the market represents an ocean
of players who meet randomly irrespective of their type. Hence, if the market opens up, a firm’s
probabilityofbeingmatchedwithaworkeroftypeisequalto>E6where6 ' `*E8 n`.
Analogously, the probability of a worker to be matched equals   6 ' 8*E8 n `.I f a
match is formed, the two agents play a contractual game specified below. If this game leads to
the implementation of a contract, both players leave the market. Otherwise, they re-enter the
matching market.
43 In doing so we follow Gale (1987) and Peters (1992). In contrast, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) take the
stocks in the market as the primitives and adjust entry flows to ensure stationarity. For more on this distinction see
Osborne and Rubinstein (1997, Chapter 7).
44 Proportional probabilities are assumed, for instance, in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Gale (1987).
Anonymity and stationarity are standard assumptions. The impact of non-anonymity has been explored in Ru-
binstein and Wolinsky (1990).
6By now it should be obvious that frictions in the market will imply delay, which should
always be costly to players. To ensure that this is indeed the case, we must assume that agents
are also impatient about realizing their outside options.12
(A.6) Lf : f, T f : f
2.3 Contractual Games
If a match is formed, the following games are played. With probability f 	   K	 the
worker is chosen to make a one-shot offer. We denote this game by K`. We introduce the
following convention: We allow the worker to propose also the null contract > which leads to
the immediate separation of the match. His actions are thus restricted to f '  ^i > j . For
notational convenience we further restrict attention to strategies where players randomize at
most over a countable number of actions. The mixed strategy of a single worker of type  is
thus a distribution over f denoted by 4`EcS. The firm may either accept or reject the offer.
Denote the acceptance probability of the firm by `EcS.
With probability K the firm is chosen to make an offer. We specify that the firm can offer a
menu of contracts. We restrict the menu to a finite number   7  of deterministic contracts.13
It is also convenient to specify that the menu contains the null contract leading to a separation
of the match. If iSE?jf$?$ denotes a single menu, we specify SEf ' >, while SE? 5  for
?:f. The firm’s mixed strategy represents a distribution 4`EiSEj over the set of menus
i>j^. Theworkermaynowchooseaparticularcontractinthemenu. Observethatchoosing
? 'fis equivalent to rejecting the offer. The mixed strategy of a worker of type  when facing
a menu iSEj is thus a distribution 8EciSEjc? over f  ?  .
2.4 Discussion of the Modelling Assumptions
As our model constitutes a comparatively new approach to model markets with adverse selec-
tion, we should comment in more detail on the individual building blocks.
Matching market
Three elements are key to the definition of the market, which are discussed in turn.
45 Technically, (A.6) ensures that the market does not clog up over time. Alternatively, this could be ensured by
introducing a positive entry cost or some (additive) search costs.
46 In what follows, we will restrict ourselves to a characterization for low frictions where only the (adjacent)
upwards incentive compatibility constraints become important. As it is well-known, assuming that g5y+l>|,@g|5
is nonincreasing in l ensures that randomization over contracts in F does not benefit the firm. Moreover, it is
straightforward to show that randomization over contracts in F and the possibility to break-up the match (i.e. the
null contract >) is not profitable even though reservation values become type-dependent.
7Frictions: We assume that agents are impatient and therefore prefer to contract immediately
insteadofwaitingtobematchedanew. Allresultswouldcontinuetoholdifwespecifiedinstead
that agents do not discount future payoffs but incur ‘‘search’’ costs r:f from (re-)entering the
matching market.
Matching technology: Though we specify a proportional matching technology, our results
rely only on two properties: continuity and monotonicity in the stocks of agents. In particular,
we could assume that only the ‘‘long’’ side of the market is rationed, while the ‘‘short’’ side
finds a matching partner with probability one.
Flows and stocks: The primitives of our model are the potential entrants arriving at the
market fringe each period. An alternative approach would be to take the stocks in the market
as primitives and adjust entries and exits to ensure stationarity.14 We refer the reader to the
thorough arguments in Gale (1987) who convincingly argues in favor of the former approach.
A completely different and equally attractive setting would, however, be to consider a market
with fixed stocks which clears over time. With complete information this approach has been
pursued, for instance, by Binmore and Herrero (1988) and Gale (1987). Our arguments and
results do not necessarily extend to this setting.
Contractual games
The specification of the contractual games contains two major ingredients.
Bothsidesareactive: Bywaitingsufficientlylong,anagentcanbesurethathewillbechosen
as the proposer in some match. Allowing both sides of the market to become active is a crucial
ingredient of any matching model. Otherwise, one encounters the well-known monopoly price
paradoxon (see Diamond (1972)) which would cause the market to shut down.
Random choice and one-shot offers: In line with most contributions to the matching market
literature we specify that with a fixed probability either side may be chosen to make a one-shot
proposal. Given our motivation in the introduction, it seems moreover natural to combine the
two standard (one-shot) settings. In Section 6 we comment on alternative specifications such
as alternating offers or allowing also workers to propose menus.
2.5 Equilibria
We now derive equilibrium requirements. We first discuss the requirements for strategies in the
contractual games and turn next to equilibrium conditions for the matching market.
47 For more on this approach, see the working paper version (Inderst (1999c)).
8Contractual games
Werestrictattentiontosymmetricandstationarystrategies.15 ForthesignalinggameK`,w e
denote a firm’s posterior beliefs if it observes the offer S by ZEcS. We require that strategies
in K` are sequentially optimal and that firms consistently update their beliefs. By the latter
requirement it holds that ZEcS'>E4`EcS*d
S
MU >E4`EcSo in case 4`EcS : f
for some  5 U. (Recall that >E denotes the distribution of types in the market.) Similarly,
we require for the screening game K8 that strategies are sequentially optimal. We summarize
strategies and beliefs for K` by j` 'E 4`c`cZ and strategies for K8 by j8 'E 48c8.
Given strategies for both games and both agents, we can define allocations as follows. For
K` define for all S 5 f the probability k`EcS'4`EcS`EcS. We denote the support








and denote the support by 8E. We define the aggregate support by E'`E ^ 8E.
If E _  is non-empty, we may also define for type  the distribution of contracts S 5 
which he implements in the market. By stationarity, the distribution function is given by
qEcS'
Kk8EcSnE  Kk`EcS
  Kk8Ec>  E  Kk`Ec>
 (1)
Matching market
We already noted that we restrict attention to stationary market environments implying that
we can neglect the time subscripts for stocks, entries, and exits for all agents. As is well known,
there always exists the trivial case where the market fails to open up as agents of either side will
not enter. In what follows, we will neglect this possibility. We next require that the decisions to
enter (or not) are optimal. To evaluate this choice, we must calculate reservation values realized
inthemarket. Asenteringthemarketrequiresoneunitoftime,reservationvaluesareequivalent
to an agent’s expected utility after dissolving a match unsuccessfully. They are denoted by L-
for firms and by T -E for workers of type . We introduce the convention that LEc>'L-







48 As players are allowed to randomize and as we consider a continuum of agents on either side, the symmetry
restriction is only for convenience. Stationarity of strategies implies in particular that reservation values (in the
market) become stationary. If contracts specified only a transfer, stationarity of reservation values would follow
from the assumed stationarity of the market (see Gale (1987)). To see why this is not sufficient in our case, observe












































For instance, the agent of type  realizes in a given match the expected utility KT 8EnE
KT `E as the game K8 (K`) is played with probabilityK (K). With probability 6the agent
has to wait for the next round.






f if L- 	L f
5 dfc8fo if L- ' Lf
8f if L- :L f

The respective condition for workers is analogous.
Summary of equilibrium conditions





satisfying the following requirements:
1. Strategies in K8 are symmetric, stationary, and sequentially optimal.
2. Strategies in K` are symmetric, stationary, and sequentially optimal, while beliefs are
consistently updated.
3. Entry decisions are optimal.
4. The market is stationary, i.e. .`E'f`E and .8 ' f8.16
3. Convergence of Contracts
In this section we show that the distribution of contracts implemented in the matching mar-
kets converges as frictions vanish if we impose additionally an intuitive restriction on the set of
equilibria. We start by deriving a family of contracts which becomes essential in characterizing
the limit outcome.
49 Note that exit flows are fully determined by stocks and strategies in the contractual games.
103.1 The Rothschild-Stiglitz Contracts





i) For  'the contract S-7E maximizes T EcS subject to S 5  and LEcS  Lf.
ii) For : the contract S-7E maximizes T EcS subject to S 5 , LEcS  Lf,a n d
T E  cS  T E  cS -7E  .
Define the realized utilities by T -7E'T EcS-7E. The following result is standard
given (A.1)-(A.3).




MU is uniquely determined and satisfies LEcS-7E '
Lf, +-7E  +-7E for all : , and global incentive compatibility (i.e. T -7E 





MU the Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) contracts as these contracts would emerge
in the two-stage screening game described in the introduction.17 For an illustration, consider
again the examples introduced in Section 2.
Examples
- The Spence case: Recall that we specify in this case T EcS'|+*@ and LEcS'@|
for  5 U,w h e r e@ :@  for : . For7  '2it is easily checked that the RS contracts specify
+-7E ' fand|-7E ' @Lf, +-7E2 ' @E@2@and|-7E2 ' @2Lf. Therespective
utilities are equal to T -7E ' @  Lf and T -7E2 ' @2  @E@2  @*@2  Lf.
- Working hours: Recall that in this case the sorting variable +, which represents working
hours, is not purely dissipative. Indeed, we ensured for the first-best choices that+WE :+ WE
for : . Hence, in contrast to the Spence case, first-best choices of + are type-dependent.
This may even ensure that the family of first-best contracts iSWEjMU is incentive compatible
such that S-7E'SWE for all types.
3.2 Convergence Result
Observe that in our model the stock of agents in the market is determined endogenously as the
primitives are the constant flows of potential entrants arriving at the market fringe each period.
As a consequence, the model does not impose any inherent restrictions on the size of stocks
4: This family of contracts features also prominently in the signaling literature. In standard (monotonic) signaling
games it would be selected by the Divinity criterion of Cho and Sobel (1990), while Kreps and Sobel (1994) show
that it is selected by the Intuitive Criterion if utilities are transferable and the game exhibits a ‘‘take-it-or-leave-it
setup’’.
11other than the requirement that entries must be equal to exits. We regard it as (economically)
reasonabletoimposesucharestriction. Ifthemarketsizeremainsbounded(asfrictionsvanish),
it can be shown that the distribution of equilibrium contracts converges. Moreover, we show
existence of a sequence of equilibria with this property.
The important implications of imposing an upper bound on the stocks of agents are that
neither the measure of firms nor the measure of low-type agents explodes as frictions vanish.
Indeed, in Section 5 we construct sequences of equilibria where one of these requirements fails
and the convergence result does not hold. To be more precise, convergence fails if search costs
incurred by firms do not vanish for B $ . Formally, this is the case if
s '
B6K
  BE  6K
does not converge to one if B $ . Observe that for this to hold 6 $ f is necessary but
not sufficient. Hence, in what follows we will impose the requirement that s $ , which is
weaker than requiring that the measure of firms remains bounded. The second requirement is
now that the distribution of types in the market remains bounded away from the boundaries of
the simplex {U. As it can be shown that all workers enter for low frictions and that workers of
the highest type will always conclude a contract in the screening game K8, this is equivalent to
requiring that the measure of workers remains bounded for B $ .
For the rest of this section we thus impose the following restriction on equilibria, where
:f is some upper bound.
Equilibrium selection: Define for B	 the set [BE satisfying:
1) For all  5 [BE the aggregate stock of workers in the market must satisfy `	 .
2) For any 0:f there exists7 B	 such that for all B:7 B and equilibria  5 [BE it holds
that s:  0.
In Section 4 we will prove that there exists a finite  such that the set of equilibria [BE
satisfying 1) and 2) is in fact non-empty for all sufficiently large values of B.
The derivation of our convergence result proceeds now in two steps. We first prove that
reservation values must converge as frictions vanish. This result will then be used to derive the
convergence of the distribution of implemented contracts.
Proposition 1. For any 0:f there exists 7 B	 such that for all B:7 B,  5 [BE,a n d





The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A proceeds in several steps. For an intuition we
12briefly outline the argument. Observe first that, by stationarity, the firms’ utility realized in the
matching market must be equal to Lf. Otherwise, the market could not be stationary or firms
would not find it optimal to enter at all. By (A.4) this implies that all workers will enter as
frictions become sufficiently low. As the stock of workers in the market remains bounded, the
distribution of types remains bounded away from the boundaries of the simplex {U as B $ .
As additionally s $  holds by assumption, it becomes virtually costless for firms to wait until
they find themselves in a ‘‘specific’’ match, e.g. in a match where they propose a contract to
some type . Suppose now that reservation values do not satisfy (3). By the nature of the RS
contracts this would imply that there are some unrealized gains for firms to trade with specific
types. These gains would be realized as B $ . Precisely, consider the case of an upper
boundary on T -7E and assume that the claim holds for all types 	 , but not for type .B y
construction of the RS family of contracts, any contract S realizing T E  cS  T -7E and
T EcS :T-7E must yield LEcS 	L f. Hence, it would only be proposed or accepted by
firms if they simultaneously realize more than Lf with some (higher) types. It is shown that
this cannot be the case in equilibrium as firms would be better off by restricting an offer to these
(higher) types. The main complication in the proof of Proposition 1 is that we allow both sides
to randomize when offering and when responding to a proposal.
DenotenextforsomecontractS 5  the0-neighborhoodbylES,0. Theconvergenceresult,
which is proved in Appendix B, can then be stated as follows.
Proposition 2. For any 0:f there exists 7 B	 such that for all B:7 B,  5 [BE,  5 U,
and corresponding distributions of contracts qEc with support E it holds that18
[
SMEKlES-7Ec0
qEcS :   0
In words, as frictions become smaller, any type  must implement contracts in a small neigh-
borhood of his respective RS contract with a probability close to one. This result is intuitive
given the continuity of payoff functions and the characterization of reservation values in Propo-
sition 2.
RecallnowfromtheintroductionthatthefamilyofRScontractsisimplementedintheunique
equilibrium (if firms play pure strategies) of the one-shot screening game. In contrast, multiple
equilibria with highly different outcomes are obtained under signaling. Embedding the contract
design in a matching market environment allows us to account for the simultaneous presence of
4; Hence, along a sequence of equilibria where  $ 4, the distributions for some type l weakly converge to the
RS distribution UV+l, which puts mass one on fUV+l,. The set of equilibrium distributions converges to UV+l,
with respect to the topology derived from the Hausdorff metric.
13screeningandsignaling. TheconvergenceresultsofPropositions1-2aredrivenbythepresence
ofscreening. Intuitively,thesameforcesasinthestandardtwo-stagemodelofscreeningarestill
active in the matching market framework (under the assumed restrictions). As a consequence,
contracts implemented by some worker must truly reflect the worker’s type, while ensuring
incentive compatibility.
4. Endogenization of the Distribution of Types
In this section we argue that the set of equilibria characterized in Propositions 1-2 is not
empty. Moreover, we feel that the way how this is established is itself of economic interest.
While typically models of adverse selection specify an exogenous distribution of types, this
becomes endogenous in the matching market environment. As the distribution of contracts
converges for B $ , the distribution of agents in the market will adjust to ensure that it is
optimal for agents to make and accept the respective proposals.
To put this into perspective, we know from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) that the family
of RS contracts is only interim efficient (in the sense of Holmström and Myerson (1983)) if




MU fails to be interim
efficient, it cannot arise as an equilibrium in the standard two-stage screening model where
firms compete for workers.
We proceed now as follows. We first give a constructive proof of existence for the two-
type Spence case, which illustrates the interdependence between the distribution of types in the
market and the shape of equilibrium contracts. Finally, we state an existence result for general
payoff functions.
Example: The Spence case with two types
Consider for a moment the program of a single firm which faces a single worker. The firm’s
beliefs are given by > and the worker’s type-dependent reservation values are given by T -E
for  5 U ' ic2j.20 Assume additionally that T -E2 :T -E. If the firm must offer both
types a feasible contract, we obtain the following results:
i) >E :> WE ' @*@2: The unique optimal menu specifies | ' T -E and + 'ffor
 ' , + 'E T -E2  T -E@@2*E@2  @ and | ' T -E2 n ET -E2  T -E@*E@2  @
for  '2 .
4< See also Maksin and Tirole (1992) for a more thorough discussion of this issue.
53 Inderst (1999c) considers also the case with three types to show that the proposed method of construction
extends to more than two types.
14ii) >E :> WE: The unique optimal menu specifies + 'fand | ' T -E2 for  ' c2
iii) >E ' >WE: The firm is indifferent between the menus i) and ii).
Return now to the matching market environment and consider a sequence of equilibria B 5
[BE where B $ . It is intuitive from the above analysis that the distribution of types cannot
satisfy >BE 	> WE as firms would then strictly prefer to offer a pooling contract.21 Hence, if
the distribution among entrants satisfies >fE 	> WE, the resulting distribution in the market
mustputmoreweightonlowtypes. Thisisaccomplishedbycreatingdifferent(expected)times
of circulation for low and high types. Precisely, we will ensure in this case that the distribution
in the market is equal to >WE. Firms are then indifferent between offering a pooling or a
separating menu. If reservation values converge to the RS utilities where T -7E2 :T-7E,
low types strictly prefer to be pooled with high types. This ‘‘cross-subsidization’’ will ensure
that the reservation value for  'satisfies T -E ' T -7E even at values B	,22 which
in turn makes firms indifferent between offering the low type an acceptable contract or not.
Similarly, in K` the low type becomes indifferent between implementing S-7E or dissolving
the match unsuccessfully. It then remains to adequately choose the probabilities of breakdown
to arrive at >WE.
We consider now two cases in turn.
Case 1 of the example: >fE  >WE
Inthiscaseweconstructequilibriawherethedistributioninthemarketisequaltothatamong
potential entrants. We will index the equilibrium variables by B. Suppose for K` that type 
offers | ' @Lf, + ' +-7E.I nK8firms specify for the low type + 'f , |8
B E ' T -
B E,a n d
for the high type +8
B E2 ' ET -
B E2  T -
B E@@2*E@2  @, |8
B E2 ' T -
B E2 n +8
B E2*@2.A l l
matches are successful, and we specify that all workers enter (.`
B E'fE), which implies
>BE'>fE. For firms we specify .8
B ' .`





BE  6BE  K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54 The non-existence result is formally derived in Inderst (1999c).
55 Of course, the probability with which firms choose the pooling contract will go to zero as  $ 4.
15Requiring L-
B ' Lf and substituting, we obtain
6B '
LfE  BK
BKE>fE@ n >fE2@2  LfnBE  KLf (5)
Observe that *4B< 6B '7 6 for some f 	 7 6	, implying in particular that sB $ .B y
specifying the stocks `fE'`BEE  6B and `f ' 8B6B, we ensure that the market is
stationary.
Observe next that by (A.6), *4B< 6B '7 6, and the definition of reservation values, there
exists some finite  such that T -
B E :T fEholds for  5 U and high B, while `B 	 .
The first implication ensures that entry is optimal for all workers. As >fE  >WE and
T -
B E 	T -7E, we know from previous results that firms cannot profitably deviate in K8.
Finally, workers’ strategies in K` can be supported by pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Summing up results, we have found a finite  such that [BE is non-empty for sufficiently
high B.
Case 2 of the example: >fE 	> WE
In this case we construct equilibria where the fraction of low types in the market strictly
exceeds the proportion among potential entrants. Precisely, we will ensure that>BE ' >WE.
This will be established as matches with  'will be broken up unsuccessfully with sufficient
probability. Denote the probability with which matches with low types are successful by 7 4.
Matches with high types are always successful. By stationarity and the assumption that all
workers enter, >BE ' >WE implies the requirement that
>fE
7 4d  >fEo n >fE
' >
WE
Given some matching probability 6B, the stock of workers is given by `fE2 ' E 
6B`BE2 and `fE ' E6B`BE7 4. We turn next to the contractual games. Suppose for
K` that  '2offers | ' @2n+-E2*@2 and + ' +-7E2,w h i l e 'proposes with probability
f  4`
B   the contract | ' @, + 'f , and with probability   4`
B the null contract.23 In
K8 firms offer with probability 4
8c
B : f a single (pooling) contract + 'f , | ' T -
B E2,w h i l e
offering with probability 4
8c7
B the separating menu with S8
B E and S8
B E2 described in Case 1.




B firms offer only S8
B E2 to  '2 . Observe that these strategies
yield







We impose now the requirement that T -
B E ' T -7E holds for all sufficiently high values
56 Recall that this is equivalent to offering any unacceptable contract.







6B nE  6BE  K4
8c
B 
l ' @  L
f. (7)
Observe that the reservation value for  '2is still given by (4). To obtain the reservation
value of firms, note that by previous results firms are indeed indifferent between all three spec-
ified offers as T -
B E ' T -7E and >BE ' >WE.T h i sy i e l d sL-
B ' sBd>WE@ n>WE@2
T -
B E2o, which allows to obtain a unique matching probability 6B from the requirement that
L-
B ' Lf. Indeed, inspection reveals that 6B is again uniquely determined by (5).24 It remains
to determine the probabilities with which agents randomize over the specified proposals. From
( 7 )w ec a ns o l v ef o rau n i q u ev a l u ef 	4
8c
B 	  if B is sufficiently high.25 Observe in par-
ticular that *4B< 4
8c




satisfying jointly with 4
8c




B  , 4`
B  . The way we have
constructed the equilibrium candidate, only the sum of 4
8c7
B and 4`
B is uniquely determined.
The rest of the argument is now analogous to that in Case 1.
WeshouldnotethatevenforCase1with>fE  >WEthe(refined)setofequilibria[BE
maybequitelarge. ThoughProposition2putsmuchstructureonthedistributionofequilibrium
contracts for low frictions, this is not the case for the distribution of types in the market.
Observe finally that we have use mixed strategies to construct equilibria in Case 2. Given a
continuum of firms, this is equivalent to specifying asymmetric pure strategies. Moreover, the
nature of the mixed strategy equilibrium is different to that obtained in a two-stage screening
game, where pure strategy equilibria fail to exist if >fE 	> WE.26 In the two-stage model
strategies are not ex-post optimal, i.e. individual firms would like to readjust their strategies
after observing their opponents choices. Of course, this is not an issue in our model.
General payoff functions
We state next an existence result for general payoff functions satisfying (A.1)-(A.3). Pre-
cisely, we want to ensure for sufficiently high B existence of a sequence of equilibria where
for B $  the stock of workers remains bounded, while s $ . Recall that these were the
requirements imposed for the definition of [BE in Section 3.
57 To see this, substitute Y U
 +5, and observe that +4,d4 . +5,d5 @ d5  d4+d5  d4,@d5 holds by+4, @
d4@d5.
58 This is possible as olp$4 Y U
 +5, @ Y UV+5, AYUV+4, and olp$4 p @ p.
59 See Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) on existence of the mixed strategy equilibrium in this case.
17For the sake of brevity, Appendix C only states the proof for7  '2 . The arguments used in
the proof, however, extend to any finite7 .27.
Proposition 3. Consider the case with 7  '2 . Then we can find 7 B	 and a finite  such
that there exists for all B:7 B an equilibrium denoted by B where `	and where, given
the specified values of 6B, it holds that ,6B<sB ' .
5. Unbounded Markets
In this section we show by example that the convergence results of Propositions 1-2 cease to
hold if we do not restrict attention to some selection [BE. Recall that the restriction consists
of two parts. First, search costs for firms must vanish for B $  as s $ . Second, the stock of
workers must remain bounded. Throughout this section we will use as an example the two-type
Spence case.
5.1 Firms Flooding the Market
We derive an example where s does not converge to  for B $ . Observe first that s $ 
is surely necessary to obtain the convergence result in Propositions 1-2, as otherwise given the
convergence of contracts firms would not be able to realize Lf. What is, however, of more
interest is the fact that such a sequence of equilibria exists. To put this into some perspective,
suppose first that there is no private information.
The benchmark with complete information
For low frictions it is straightforward to show that there exists a unique equilibrium (of the
two-type Spence case) where all workers enter and all matches are successful. Contracts are
free of distortions (+ 'f ), while transfers are chosen to make the responding party indifferent
between acceptance and rejection. Requiring L-











BE  6BE  K





BKE>fE@ n >fE2@2  LfnBE  KLf
5: We should note that the delicate issue is not to establish existence of an equilibrium, but of a sequence of
equilibria where  $ 4, Z?P ,a n dolp$4 i @4
18For B $  the aggregate surplus realized by a newly entering cohort of workers becomes
`fd
S
MU >fErEc+WE  Lf  T fo28.
We construct now an equilibrium with private information where inefficiencies will persist
even as frictions vanish. Suppose that >fE  >WE.I nK` type  'proposes | ' @  Lf
and + ' +-7E ' f,w h i l e '2proposes+`
B E2 ' +-7E2n{and | ' @2Lf. The value {
satisfies f 	 {  E@2 @2. (Recall that T -7E2 T -7E ' E@2 @2*@2.) In K8the firm
offers a menu which specifies for the low type + 'fand |8
B E ' T -
B ELf, and for the high
type +8
B E2 ' ET -
B E2T -
B E@@2*E@2 @ and |8
B E2 ' T -
B E2n+8
B E2*@2. Moreover, all
workers enter, i.e. .`
B E'fE. As all matches are successful, this implies >BE'>fE.
For firms we specify .8
B ' .`
B . Substituting T -
B E into the requirement L-
B ' Lf yields
a unique matching probability 6B, satisfying ,6B<6B 'f . As we can specify pessimistic
beliefs in K8 and as >fE  >WE, it is easily checked that strategies in the contractual games
are optimal.29
As stocks in the market are given by `BE'`fE*E6B and 8B ' `f*6B, 8B grows
beyond any boundary as B $ . More precisely, the stock of firms grows sufficiently fast such











To see why this is intuitive, observe that ,6B<T -
B E ' T -7E and ,6B<T -
B E2 '
T -7E2  {*@2. As a consequence, firms can realize strictly more than Lf in K8. However,
to keep the market stationary, firms must be kept indifferent between entering or not, implying
that their circulation time grows beyond any boundary as B $ .31 As frictions vanish, the
resulting efficiency gains are thus almost entirely offset by increasing the expected waiting
time for firms. This type of inefficiency was completely absent in the benchmark case with
5; We should not that for ?4 the market outcome is generally inefficient due to two well known reasons. First,
markets where transfers are determined after matches have formed fail to internalize the impact of players’ entry
decision on the matching probability of other agents (see Hosios (1990). Second, a single matching market cannot
adequately adjust to the preferences of heterogenous agents (on one side), i.e. to the different marginal rates of
substitution between the speed and the terms of trade (see e.g. Moen (1997)).
5< Observe in particular that Y U
 +4, ?YUV+4, ensures that it is not optimal for firms to offer only a contract to
l @5 .
63 To see this, observe for I that in the limit firms realize with high types X3.@d5.|UV+5,@d5|I
4 +5,@d5,
where we substiuted d5  |UV+5,@d5 @ X3 . Y UV+5,.
64 In other words, circulation time and delay of trading become now an essential equilibrating device in a market
with adverse selection. This is reminiscent of the Walrasian approach in Gale (1992, 1996) who considers a one-
shot setting where probability of trade may vary in various (contractual) submarkets.
19complete information.3233
Recall at this point that we constructed an equilibrium in Proposition 3 where high types
implement S-7E2 in K8. We showed that the resulting unique matching probability 6B was
identical to that in (8), implying in particular that the low type’s utility was unaffected by the
presence of private information. In contrast, low types are better off in the ‘‘unbounded’’ equi-
librium where firms flood the market.
5.2 Low Types Flooding the Market
We will show that the following strategies constitute an equilibrium for sufficiently high B.A l l
workersenterandofferinK` thepoolingcontractwith+ 'fand| ' @Lfn>BE2E@2@,
where the distribution of types in the market will be derived endogenously. Observe that firms
are indifferent between accepting and rejecting the proposal, which allows to specify that firms
accept with some probability 4`
B 5 dfco. Below we will specify that both types do not receive




BE  6BE  K








B E@  L
f n >BE2E@2  @

c
implying in particular that T -
B E ' T -
B E2.I nK8 firms offer a single contract with + 'fand
| ' T -
B E2. Asthis offermakes bothtypesindifferent, we canassume thatit isonly acceptedby
the high type. Combining the specification of strategies for the two games and the assumption
that all workers enter, The distribution >BE2 is equal to dE  K4`
B >fE2o*d n K>fEo.W e




-7E ' @  L
f (9)




  BE  6BK
EL
f n >BE2E@2  @ (10)
Observe finally that the specified strategies are indeed optimal if equations (9)-(10) have a
solution.
65 Weshouldnotethattheoutcomeundercompleteinformationdependsontheassumptionthatonesideischosen
to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Other forms of ex-post agreements tend to generally induce too much entry by
traders on the long side of the market (see Peters 1992)) as the bargaining outcomes are relatively insensitive to
aggregate demand and supply (see also Bester (1987) and Muthoo (1993) on this issue.)
66 Admittedly, the relevant benchmark under private information is constrained (or interim) efficiency, as defined
e.g. by Holmström and Myerson (1983). As the delay of firms does not contribute to separation, the depicted
equilibriumwill naturally fail anadequatelydefinednotion of interimefficiency. (Circulationtimeof theinformed
party can, however, be useful as a separating device in alternative settings which allow for the co-existence of
several submarkets. This is analyzed by Inderst and Müller (1999) for a market with durable second-hand goods.)
20Existence of a solution is established for high B in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists 7 B	 such that for B:7 B the system of equations (9)-(10) has a
solution E6Bc4 `
B  where f 	6 B 	  and f 	4 `
B 	 .
Proof. Consider first (10). For given p and 3 ??4 there exists a unique value 4
+p, defined by
X3 @ i^X3 . 4
+p,+d5  d4,`. (Observe that it is not guaranteed that 4
+p,  4.) Moreover, 4
+p, is
continuous and strictly decreasing with olpp$34
+p,@4 and 4
+4, @ X3+4  ,@^+d5  d4,e`. Consider




+4  e,+3+5,  +5,,
> (11)
which is well-defined for +5, ? 3+5,. (Observe, however, that Z
  4 is only satisfied if +5, is chosen
sufficiently low.) For given p and , (9) defines a unique value 5
+p, ? 3+5, solving Y U
 +4, @ Y UV+4,.
Observe that 5
+p, is continuous and strictly increasing with olpp$45
+p,@3+5, and a finite value 5
+3,.
It also holds that olp$45
+3, @ 3 and olp$44
+4, @ 3. By the properties of 4
+p, and 5
+p,,w ec a n
thus find a threshold  4 ? 4 such that for A 4 there exists a unique value 3 ?p  ? 4 realizing +5, @
4
+p,@5
+p, ? 3+5,. It remains to show that +5, substituted into (11) realizes Z
  4 for sufficiently
high values of . This is implied by the stronger claim that olp$4Z
 @3 . If the latter assertion did not hold,
we would obtain for an adequately selected subsequence olp$4q+5, @  A3. By inspection of (9) this
implies olpq$4pq @3 , while by the definition of 5
+, it must hold that olpq$4pq @4 , which yields a
contradiction. By olp$4Z
 @3we can thus indeed find some  5 ? 4 such that for A 5 it holds that Z
 ? 4.
Choosing   @ pd{
 4> 5

completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Inspectionoftheproofrevealsthat,6B<4`
B 'fand therefore ,6B<>BE2 ' f. Observe
that in the constructed equilibrium low-type workers only implement the contract with + 'f
and | ' @  Lf n >BE2E@2  @, which actually converges to their RS contract. However,
as ,6B<4`
B 'f , high-type workers will for high B almost always implement the contract
proposed in K8, which specifies + 'fand thus differs from their RS contract. Interestingly,
observethatthesurplusrealizedinasuccessfulmatchspecifiesthefirst-bestvalueofthesorting
variable + 'f . However, as firms realize Lf and as ,6B<T -
B E'@  Lf for both types
 5 U, much surplus gets dissipated by search frictions as B $ . (Observe, however, that this
time s converges to  as B $ .)
In the light of Proposition 2 and the two examples where convergence fails as the market
size increases beyond any boundary, it would be interesting to know more about the efficiency
properties of different equilibria. The derived results suggest that there is a trade-off between
dissipatingsurplusbyexcessivesearchorcirculationtimeandreducingthesurplusinindividual
matches by distorting the sorting variable.
216. Conclusion
This paper explores a new approach to analyze markets with adverse selection. We con-
sider a matching market environment where in a given match either side may have the right
of proposal. This allows for the simultaneous presence of signaling and screening. Our ap-
proach yields three main insights. First, if the market size remains bounded as frictions vanish,
the distribution of implemented contracts converges. Second, the distribution of types in the
market must not necessarily reflect the distribution among entrants as different types may have
different circulation times depending on how successful their matches are. Third, matching
markets with adverse selection may exhibit a new type of inefficiency which is absent in mar-
kets with complete information: excessive circulation of either firms or low types (of workers).
In essence, this is due to the fact that high types may realize less than their ‘‘true’’ share of the
surplus if firms have pessimistic beliefs. The residual surplus is then offset by sufficiently long
circulation of either firms or low types. Of course, by the convergence result, this inefficiency
vanishes if frictions disappear and the market size remains bounded.
To our knowledge this paper represents the first contribution which models markets with
adverse selection in this fashion. To conclude we want to stress one avenue for further research.
We conjecture that our convergence result is independent of the particular contractual games, as
long as the uninformed side has some right of proposal. However, we would find it worthwhile
to explore the following two alternatives. First, we may allow also the informed party to pro-
pose a menu of offers from which it can pick any contract after acceptance.34 This would put
additional restrictions on the set of equilibrium outcomes.35 Second, a natural way of modeling
bargaining in a match would be to consider a game of alternating offers. Unfortunately, there
is so far almost no literature on bargaining over contracts (with an open time horizon) even in
a bilateral monopoly.36
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Theproofproceedsinaseriesofclaims. Claims1-2deriveimplicationswhichareintuitivegiventheprimitives
of our matching models. In Claim 1 we show that XU @ X3, which is subsequently used to prove that all workers
67 In a bilateral monopoly this approach has been pioneered by Maskin and Tirole (1992).
68 Indeed, we conjecture for this specification that we can find for given primitives a threshold  e?4 such that
for eA e equilibrium outcomes converge to the RS allocation of contracts as frictions vanish.
69 To our knowledge, alternating offers with private information and a sorting variable have only been considered
in Inderst (1999b). However, this contribution is restricted to two types, private values, and only a subset of
parameters (discount factors). Inderst (1998) considers the case where only the uninformed party makes offers but
cannot commit to a final proposal.
22enter for high .
Claim 1. In all # 5  it holds that XU @ X3.
Proof. Recall that we restrict consideration to equilibria where the market opens up, implying XU  X3.A s
agents exit in pairs, I3 AZ3 implies XU  X3 to ensure stationarity. Q.E.D.
Claim 2. There exists  4 ? 4 such that for all A 4, # 5 +P,, and l 5 L it holds that HZ+l,@Z3+l,.
Proof. We first prove by contradiction that HZ+ l,@Z3+ l,. Otherwise, there exists a sequence # where
 $ 4, # 5 +P,,a n dHZ
 + l, ?Z 3+ l,. (Observe that all variables determined in # are indexed by
.) By (A.4), HZ
 + l, ?Z 3+ l, implies Y U
 +l,@Y 3 if HZ
 +l, A 3 for some l? l. Observe next that from
(A.3)-(A.4) it holds that X+l>fUV+4,,  X3 and Y +l>fUV+4,, AY 3 for all l 5 L,i m p l y i n gt h a tf with w @
wUV+4,.+Y +4>f UV+4,,Y 3,@5 and | @ |UV+4, is strictly acceptable to all types. If a firm rejects all offers and
proposes f in I, the expected utility is bounded from below by a X @ i^X3 .+ Y +4>f UV+4,,  Y 3,@5`,w h e r e
i @
ep
4   ^4  ep`
=
If a worker of type l behaves similarly, we obtain as a lower boundary a Y @ j^Y 3 .+ Y +4>f UV+4,  Y 3,@5`,
where
j @
+4  e,+4  p,
4   ^4  +4  e,+4  p,`
=
As XU
 @ X3 by Claim 1, it must hold that a X  X3, which implies olp$4 i ? 4 and therefore olp$4 j @
4. As a consequence, a YA Y 3 holds if A 
4
4 for some  
4
4 ? 4, which yields a contradiction to Y U
 + l,@Y 3.
We next extend the claim to all l? l.B y HZ
 + l,@Z3+ l, we obtain p ?p E
k for some pE
k ? 4,a s
otherwise Z ?Pcould not be ensured. If a type l enters the market, his utility is bounded from below by a Y
as defined above. As p ?p E
k implies olp$4 j @4 , this exceeds Y 3 if A 
5
4 for some  
5
4 ? 4= Choosing








completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Claim 2 has the following implications for A 4 and # 5 +P,. We already observed in the proof of
Claim 2 that p ?p E
k ? 4 must hold to ensure Z ?P. By the same argument there exists E ? 4 such that
Z+l>>,.I+l>>, ? E for all l 5 L. (Recall that I+l>>, denotes the probability with which a match with
type l is broken up in I.) Moreover, by Z+l,  HZ
 +l,@Z3+l, and Z ?Pthere exists E A 3 such that
+l, A E for all l 5 L. Given the definition of +P, and p ?p E
k it follows for any sequence of equilibria
# where  $ 4 and # 5 +P, that i $ 4 and j $ 4,w h i l eb y+l, A E it also holds for all l 5 L that37
+l,ep
4   ^4  +l,ep`
$ 4= (12)
These results will be frequently used in what follows. We proceed by deriving a lower bound on reservation
values.
Claim 3. For any %A3 there exists  5 ? 4 such that for all A 5, # 5 +P, and corresponding
reservation values Y U+l,, it holds that Y UV+l,  %?YU+l,.
Proof. The proof is inductive. Consider l @4 . We argue to a contradiction and assume that there exists
a sequence of equilibria # where  $ 4, # 5 +P,,a n dY U
 +4,  Y UV+l,  %. A firm offering f with
6: By definition of +P, the convergence is uniform.
23w @ wUV+4,  %@5 and | @ |UV+4, in I while rejecting all offers in Z receives at least
+4,ep
4  ^4  +4,ep`
+X3 . %@5,> (13)
where we use common values and X+4>f UV+4,,  X3. By (12), the expression (13) exceeds X3 if A 5+4,
for some  5+4, ? 4, which yields a contradiction. Assume now that the assertion holds up to a type l  4 ?  l.
We argue again to a contradiction. Recall next that the RS family of contracts is by Lemma 0 globally incentive
compatible. By the inductive claim, the contract f with | @ |UV+l, and wUV+l,  w @ %@5 is rejected by all
types m?land accepted by l if  becomes sufficiently large. Hence, by an argument as for l @4 , the firms’
expected payoff is bounded from below by ^+l,ep`^X3 . %@5`@^4   ^4  +l,ep``, which again exceeds
X3 if A 5+l, for some  5+l, ? 4. Choosing  5 @  5+ l, proves the claim by the finiteness of L. Q.E.D.
We turn next to the upper bound on reservation values. We proceed indirectly by proving a result on the set of
implemented contracts, where we discuss first the case of l @4 .
Claim 4. For any  %A3 there exists  6+ %, ? 4 such that for all A 6+ %, and # 5 +P,, it holds that
[
f5E+4,_ifmY +4>f,Y UV+4,. %j
+Z+4>f,.I+4>f,, ?  %
Proof. We argue to a contradiction and assume that there exists a sequence # 5 +P,,w h e r e $ 4,s u c h




 +4>f,,   % and Y +4>f,  Y UV+4,. %
for all f 5 F. Define next FI
 @ F _ EI
 +4, and FZ
 @ F _ EZ
 +4,. We distinguish between two cases. We











q+4>f,   %@5 holds.






 +4>f,   %@5. Weprovefirstthefollowing
implication.
Assertion 1. Under the assumption of Case i), there exists (for given  %) a sequence of contracts ifjand types
ilj,a n dav a l u e %A3 such that:
i) f 5 FZ
 ; +l>f ,   %; and Z
 +4>f , A  %.
ii) X+l>f ,  X3 . % with l 9@4 .




 +4>f,   %@5implies the existence of a sequence of contracts ifj and
of two values  %4> %5 A 3 such that the following two claims hold:
-I ff is offered in Z, a firm accepts with probability not below  %4.
- Additionally, when observing f, the firm’s consistent beliefs put not less than probability  %5 on l @4 .38
Observe next that, for given  %A3, there exists some  %6 A 3 such that X+4>f,  X3   %6 holds for all f 5 F
whereY +4>f,  Y UV+4,. %. (Giventransferableutilitiesandthedefinitionof fUV+4,,wecanchoose %6 @ %.) By
6; More formally, take some equilibrium #. Recall that we denote the probability with which some type l pro-
poses f 5 F by Z
 +l>f, and the acceptance probability of the firm by Z
 +l>f,.A s f 5 EZ
 , beliefs are de-








 +4>f,   %@5,w h e r eZ
 +l>f,@Z
 +l>f,Z
 +l>f,. This immediately implies existence of two val-
ues  %4> %3






 +4>f, A  %3
5 and Z
 +4>f, A  %4 for all f 5  FZ
 . Finally,
the finiteness of L allows to pick a contract f 5  FZ
 and some  %5 A 3 such that indeed +4>f ,   %5.
24optimality,thefirmonlyacceptsf iftheexpectedutilityisnotbelowX3. GivenX+4>f ,  X3 %6,thefiniteness
o ft h et y p es e tL, and the fact that the firm’s posterior beliefs after observing f assign at least probability  %5 to the
type l @4 , this implies existence of some type l A 3 and a boundary  %7 A 3 such that X+l>f ,  X3 . %7.
Finally, choose  % @ plq^ %4> %5> %6> %6`. Q.E.D.
In the remainder of the proof for Case i) we show that firms can profitably deviate as  becomes sufficiently
high. We will construct a contract from f, which will be offered by firms in I and which will only attract types
l  l . For this construction we need the following auxiliary result.
Assertion 2. For any %4 there exists some a 4+%4, A 3 such that Y U
 +l, AY+l>f,  %4 for all l 5 L.
Proof. If type l follows the strategy to reject all offers and to propose f in Z, which by Assertion 1 is
accepted with a probability not below  %A3, his expected utility is bounded from below by
a Y @




4  +4  e,+4  pE
k , %
Y +l>f,>
w h e r ew eu s ep ?p E
k ? 4. The assertion follows now immediately from the equilibrium requirement that
a Y  Y U
 +l,.39 Q.E.D.
Definenowby  F thesetofcontractsf 5 F satisfyingX+l>f,  X3 andY +l>f,  Y 3 forsomel 5 L.B y( A . 1 ) ,
thefinitenessofL,andcontinuityofpayoffsthesetiscompact. By(A.2)thisimpliesexistenceoftwovalues  nA3>
n A 3,suchthatmgv+l>|,@g|m ?  n andg^y+m>|,y+l>|,`@g| A n forallf 5  F. Foranysmall%5 A 3weconstruct
now from f a contract  f+%5,, which will be used for a profitable deviation. Define  |+%5,@| .%5@n (where
| is the sorting variable in f) and adjust the transfer  w to ensure Y +l> f+%5,, @ Y +l>f ,.%5@5. Suppose for a
momentthat contractsonthelinecombining f with  f+%5,belongto  F. Bythederivedboundaries onderivatives,
thisimpliesY +m> f+%5,, ?Y+m>f,%5@5forallm?l  andX+l> f+%5,,  X+l>f,%5+ n@n,%5@5. Contracts
on the line combining f with  f+%5, belong indeed to  F for sufficiently small values of %5.40
Recallnexttheconstructionofa 4+%4,fromAssertion2. Specifying%4 ?% 5@7thusensuresthatalltypesm?l 
reject  f+%5,forAa 4+%4,. By(A.3), theutilityrealizedwithtypesmAl  isnotlowerthanX+l> f+%5,,. Hence,
the expected utility realized by a firm which follows the strategy to reject all offers and to propose  f+%5, in I,
is by Assertion 1 bounded from below by
a X @
ep+l,
4   ^4  ep+l,`

X3 . %  %5+ n@n,  %5@5

=
By (12) this strictly exceeds X3 if %5 becomes sufficiently small and  sufficiently large, which completes the
proof for case i).






 +4>f,   %@5. Inanabuseofnotation,
w ed e n o t ef o rap r o p o s e dm e n uif+,j the realized utility of type l by Y +l>if+,j,@pd{q5QY +l>f+,,.( R e c a l l
theconventionthatf+3, @ >suchthatY +l>f+3,, @ Y U
 +l,. Thisdependencyonthereservationvalueissuppressed
in the notation Y +l>if+,j,.)
Assertion 3. Under the assumption of Case ii), there exists (for given  %) a sequence of menus if+,j and a
6< To be precise, we need also that Y +l>f, is bounded from above (for any l). If this was not the case, Y U
 +l,
would grow beyond any bound, which would contradict optimality for firms.
73 More formally, this follows from Assertion 1 and Claim 3, by which Y +l>f ,  Y U
 +l, AY3 holds for low
frictions.
25value  %A3 such that:
i) I
 +if+,j, A 3; Y +4>if+,j, AYUV+4, .  %; and I
 +4>if+,j>3, ? 4  %.41
ii) X+4>f, ?X 3  % for all f 5i f+,j_F realizing Y +4>f,@Y +4>if+,j,.
iii)Forany %4thereexistssome a 5+%4, A 3suchthat Y U
 +l, AY+l>if+,j,%4 forall l 5 L and Aa 5+%4,.




 +4>f,   %@5 implies existence of a sequence of menus
denoted by  FI




 +if+,j, A  %4,w h i l eY +4>if+,j, AY UV+4, .  %
and I
 +4>if+,j>3, ? 4   %4 for all if+,j5  FI
 . In words, the set of menus  FI
 is offered with at least
probability  %4, and if a menu in this set is proposed, l @4accepts with at least probability  %4. By the finiteness
of L we can choose next some  %5 A 3 and a sequence if+,j5  FI









 m Y +l>if+,j,  Y +l>if+,j,
r
=
In words, if+,j is chosen from  FI
 to ensure that for all types l 5 L the probability that firms offer menus
in  FI
 realizing not less than Y +l>if+,j, is not below some threshold  %5. Using the arguments of Assertion 2
this immediately implies the claim iii). Finally, regarding the claim ii), by construction of fUV+4, it holds that
X+4>f, ?X 3  % in case Y +4>f, AYUV+4, .  % for f 5 F. We can now choose  % @ plqi %4> %5> %j. Q.E.D.
We are now in a position to construct a profitable deviation for firms. Assertion 3 allows us to restrict consid-
eration to deviations where firms offer in I a single contract. At this point the argument is, in fact, completely
analogous to that in Case i). We are therefore rather brief. Assertion 3 implies that we can again identify a type l
with which firms realize strictly more than X3. Denote first
a f+l, 5 dujpd{f5 a FX+l>f,,w h e r e a F @ if3 5i f+,jmY +l>f3,@Y +l>if+,j,j=
By +4, A E and i)-ii) in Assertion 3 there exists now some %A3 (depending only on  %) and some type
l A 3 such that Y +l>a f+l,,  Y U
 +l, and X+l>a f+l,, AX 3 . %.A sY U
 +l, AY+l>if+,j,  %4 holds
by iii) in Assertion 3 for all types if Aa 5+%4,, we can now construct a deviating contract from a f+l,, which is
rejected by all types l?l , while it is implemented with probability one by l. The construction is identical to
that in Case i).
Having covered all possible cases in i) and ii), the proof of Claim 4 is completed. Q.E.D.
We next extend Claim 4 to all higher types.
Claim 5. For any  %A3 there exists  7+ %, ? 4 such that for all A 7+ %,, # 5 +P,,a n dlA4 it holds
that
[
f5E+l,_ifmY +l>f,Y UV+l,. %j
+Z+l>f,.I+l>f,, ?  %. (14)
Proof. We argue by induction. Suppose the claim holds up to type l4 ? l. Precisely, we assume that for any
 %4 there exists some a 4+l  4> %4, ? 4 such that (14) holds for all Aa 4+l  4> %4, and m?l . We first prove an




denotes the probability with which type l @4 selects the variant q from the menu if+q,j. In particular,
I
 +4>if+,j>3, denotes the probability of rejection.
26Assertion 1. If (14) holds for all m?land Aa 4+l  4> %4,, then there also exists a 5+l  4> %4, ? 4 such
that for all Aa 5+l  4> %4,, # 5 +P,, and m?lit holds that Y U





 +m>f,, A E forall m 5 L. Theassertionfollowsthenimmediately
from the definition of reservation values in (2) and from the inductive assumption (i.e. from (14)). Q.E.D.
To prove the extension to type l, we argue again to a contradiction and assume that there exists a sequence




 +l>f,,   % and
Y +l>f,  Y UV+l,. % for all f 5 F.
We prove first an auxiliary result which allows us to proceed subsequently as in Claim 4.
Assertion 2. Given  % there exists a 6 ? 4 and for Aa 6 a selection  F  F, as well as some threshold





 +l>f,,   %.
ii) X+l>f, ?X 3  % for all f 5  F.
Proof. Observe first that, given  %, there exists some  %4 A 3 such that Y +l  4>f,  Y UV+l  4, .  %4 and
Y +l>f,  Y UV+l,. % must imply X+l>f, ?X 3   %4. (Formally, this follows from the definition of fUV+l, and
continuity of payoff functions.) Define the subset  F  F where f 5  F if Y +l  4>f,  Y UV+l  4, .  %4.




 +l>f,,   %@5 for Aa 6. We argue to




 +l>f,, A  %@5. Considernowthefollowingstrategyfortypel4. Byfollowing(partially)
the strategy of type l to propose or accept contracts f 5 Fq  F, the expected utility is bounded from below by
+4  pE
k , %@5
4  ^4  +4  pE
k , %@5`

Y UV+l  4, .  %4

> (15)
w h e r ew eu s ep ?p E
k ? 4. Recall from Assertion 1 that Y U
 +m,  Y UV+m,. %4 for Aa 5+l  4> %4, and
m?l . By choosing  %4 sufficiently low, the utility in (15) therefore strictly exceeds Y U
 +l4, for sufficiently high
. This yields a contradiction such that the threshold a 6 ? 4 exists. The assertion follows now from the two steps
by choosing  % @ plqi %@5> %4j. Q.E.D.
In what follows we restrict consideration to values Aa 6 such that Assertion 2 applies.
We are now in a position to argue as in Claim 4. This time the starting point is the assumed existence of a




 +l>f,,   % and Y +l>f,  Y UV+l,. % for
all f 5  F. Denote the sets  FI
 @  F _ EI
 and  FZ
 @  F _ EZ
 . We can again distinguish between two cases










q+4>f,   %.
Case i) (Subsequence  FZ
 )




 +4>f,   %@5. As in Assertion
1 of Claim 4 we can next extract a sequence ifj with f 5  FZ
 such that for some value  %A3 it holds that
+l>f,   % and Z
 +l>f, A  %. Additionally, it holds that X+l>f ,  X3 . % for some l 9@4 . Observe
that we can use from Assertion 2 (of this proof) that all f 5  FZ
 already satisfy X+l>f, ?X 3   % for a fixed
threshold  %. Assertion 2 of Claim 4 carries over immediately, i.e. for any %4 there exists some a 7+%4, ? 4 such
that Y U
 +m, AY+m>f,  %4 for all m 5 L and Aa 7+%4,. Moreover, the construction of a deviating offer  f+%5,





to complete the argument.
Case ii) (Subsequence  FI
 )




 +4>f,   %@5. Assertion 3 of
Claim 4 carries over with the modification that we have to substitute  % by the newly derived threshold  %, which
has, however, no qualitative impact on the arguments.
As the set of types is finite, Claim 5 follows from a finite repetition of the argument. Q.E.D.
Recall now that
S
f5E+l,+Z+l>f,.I+l>f,, A E holds for all l 5 L in all considered equilibria if A 4.
The following result follows then from Claims 4-5 and the definition of reservation values in (2).
Claim 6. For any %A3 there exists  8 ? 4 such that for all A 8, # 5 +P,> and corresponding
reservation values Y U+l,, it holds that Y UV+l,  %AYU+l,.
Proposition 1 follows now from Claims 3 and 6 by choosing   @ pd{
 4> 5> 8

. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in a series of steps. Claims 1-2 provide auxiliary results.
Claim 1. For any  %A3 there exists %4+ %, A 3 such that any contract f 5 F, which satisfies for some l 5 L
Y +l>f,  Y UV+l,  %4+ %,>
Y +l  4>f,  Y UV+l  4, . %4+ %, if lA4,
X+l>f,  X3  %4+ %,>
must also satisfy f 5 +fUV+l,> %,.
Proof. We argue to a contradiction. If the assertion does not hold, there exists a sequence of contracts ifqj and
types ilqj with fq @ 5 +fUV+lq,> %, and a sequence i %qj with  %q $ 3 such that
Y +lq>f q,  Y UV+lq,  %q> (16)
Y +lq  4>f q,  Y UV+lq  4, .  %q if lq A 4>
X+lq>f q,  X3  %q=
By the finiteness of L we can select a subsequence where all types lq are identical. Assume that this is satisfied
for the original sequence and a type l @ lq. Moreover, for all sufficiently small values of  %q, (16) implies from
(A.1) that all fq belong to some compact set denoted by  F. Hence, we can select a subsequence where contracts
converge to some  f 5  Fq+fUV+l,> %,. As (16) is satisfied along this sequence, this contradicts the construction
of fUV+l,. Q.E.D.
The following result is now implied by the definition of fUV+l, and the continuity of payoff functions.
Claim 2. For any  %A3 we can find %5+ %, A 3 such that the following implications hold for any f 5 F:
i) For lA4, X+l>f, AX 3 . % implies Y +l>f, ?YUV+l,  %5+ %, or Y +l  4>f, AYUV+l,.%5+ %,.
ii) For l @4 , X+4>f, AX 3 . % implies Y +4>f, ?YUV+4,  %5+ %,.
28We now proceed stepwise to reduce the set of equilibrium allocations.
Claim 3. For any  %A3 there exists  4+ %, ? 4 such that for all A 4+ %,, lA4,a n d# 5 +P, it holds
that
S
f5F+l,+Z+l>f,.I+l>f,,   %,w h e r eF+l,@

f m Y +l  4>f, AYUV+l  4, .  %

. Moreover , for all
l 5 L, Y +l>f, ?YUV+l,  % implies Z+l>f,.I+l>f,@3 .
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Proposition 1 and its proof. (The argument regarding the adjacent
type l  4 is identical to that used in Assertion 2 of Claim 5). Q.E.D.
Claim 4. For any  %A3 there exists  5+ %, ? 4 such that for all A 5+ %,, l 5 L,a n d# 5 +P,, it holds
that
S
f5F+l,+Z+l>f,.I+l>f,,   %, where F+l,@

f m X+l>f, ?X 3  %

.
Proof. We argue to a contradiction. By the finiteness of L we can then assume that there exists a type l,





 +l>f,,   % and X+l>f, ?X 3   % for all f 5 F. Recall next that the expected payoff of firms equals X3.B y
+l, A E, which was proved in Proposition 1 for sufficiently high , it follows from inspection of (2) that there
exist a sequence of types l a n do fs e t so fc o n t r a c t sF3
, and a threshold  %6 A 3, such that X+l>f, AX 3 . %6 for






 +l>f,, A  %6.
We use now Claims 2-3 to show that this can not be the case for high values of .B yC l a i m2w ek n o wt h a t
X+l>f, AX 3 . %4 implies either Y +l>f, ?Y UV+l,   %5+ %6, or Y +l  4>f, AY UV+l  4, .  %5+ %6,.






 +l>f,, A  %6@5 where either Y +l>f, ?YUV+l,   %5+ %6, or Y +l  4>f, AYUV+l 
4,. %5+ %6,. Bothpossibilitiesmust,however,contradictClaim3. Precisely,thisisthecaseifwechooseA 4+ %7,
with  %7 @ plqi %5+ %6,> %6@5j. Q.E.D.
The following assertion combines Claim 1 with Claims 3-4.
Claim 5. For any  %A3 there exists  6+ %, ? 4 such that for all A 6+ %,, l 5 L,a n d# 5 +P,, it holds
that
S
f5Fq+fUV+l,> %,+Z+l>f,.I+l>f,, ?  %.
Proof. Given some %4, it holds by Claims 3-4 for all Ap d {
 4+%4@5,> 5+%4@5,

, l 5 L, and # 5 +P,
that
S
f5F+l,+Z+l>f,.I+l>f,, ?% 4,w h e r eF+l,comprisesallcontracts f 5 F satisfyinganyofthefollowing
conditions:
-F o rlA4, Y +l  4>f, AYUV+l  4, . %4=
- Y +l>f, ?YUV+l,  %4=
- X+l>f, ?X 3  %4=
Given  % we can derive next from Claim 1 the boundary %4+ %, A 3. The claim follows then by choosing




While we have so far restricted attention to allocations, observe that the assertion in the Proposition makes a
claim on the resulting distribution of contracts, as defined in (1). Recall now from the proof of Proposition 1 that
in any considered equilibrium it holds for high  and for all l 5 L that Z+l>f,.I+l>f, A E A 3. The claim
in the proposition follows then directly from the definition (1) and Claim 5. Q.E.D.
29Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
For high  we will prove existence of an equilibrium where agents adopt the following strategies:
- All workers enter, i.e. HZ+l,@Z3+l,,w h i l eHI @ Z3.
-I nI firms choose between the following two strategies. They may either randomize over a set of menus of
which each ensures that the match is successful with both types. Or they offer a contract which is only accepted
by the high type. The latter strategy is chosen with probability 4  I.
-I nZ t h eh i g ht y p eo f f e r sfUV+5, with probability one, which is accepted. The low type offers fUV+4, only
with probability Z, while with probability 4  Z the match is dissolved unsuccessfully.
Given HZ+l,@Z3+l, and the strategies in the contractual games, we obtain for the distribution in the market
+4, @
3+4,
3+4, . 3+5,^+4  e,Z . eI`
= (17)
Moreover, observe that stocks in the markets are fully specified if we determine additionally p.
We proceed now in three steps. First, we set up a fixed-point problem in the three variables +I> Z>p, and
show that this has a solution for any . The specified solution will also determine the contracts offered in I such
that the equilibrium candidate is fully specified. As the conditions imposed for the fixed-point problem do not
already imply that strategies are optimal, we show in a second step that this is indeed the case for high values of
. Finally, we argue that the selected sequence of equilibria satisfies the asserted requirements on i and Z.
To set up the fixed-point problem, we define first some programs and derive auxiliary results.
Programs and auxiliary results
DefinethefollowingprogramS+Y U+4,>YU+5,>,: Foragivendistribution,chooseapair+f+4,>f+5,, 5 F5
to maximize
+4,+y+4>|+4,, . w+4,, . +5,+y+5>|+5,, . w+5,,
subject to the following constraints: LF+4, with Y +4>f+4,,  Y +4>f+5,,, LU+4, with Y +4>f+4,,  Y U+4,,
and LU+5, with Y +5>f+5,,  Y U+5,. (Observe that we do not consider incentive compatibility for the high type.
Moreover, themenumustspecifyanacceptablecontractforeithertype.)42 By(A.1)-(A.2)asolutionalwaysexists,
while by optimality LU+5, becomes binding. We introduce the following notation. The realized value is denoted
by XS+,. The program may have more than one solution which may also implement different utilities for the low
type. Denote by YS+, the convex set of lotteries over the low type’s utilities.
Claim 1. YS+, is USC, while XS+, is continuous (all in the parameters +Y U+4,>YU+5,>,). Moreover ,
lqi YS+, and vxsYS+, are constant in Y U+4, or increasing with slope one.43
Proof. Denote the set of solutions by FS+,. By optimality, it must hold that w+5, @ Y U+5,  y+5>|+5,, and





y+4>|+4,,. The residual program is continuous in |+5, and +Y U+4,>YU+5,>,, which together with (A.3) proves
continuity of XS+, and USC of FS+, by the maximum theorem. USC of YS+, follows from the continuity of
75 In what follows, it will be ensured that +4, A 3, while the program naturally extends to the case where
+5, @ 3.
76 For concreteness, define the slope as the right-side derivative.
30payoff functions.44 The assertions regarding lqi YS+, and vxsYS+, are immediate from the construction of the
program. Q.E.D.
Define next the program S+Y U+4,>YU+5,>,,w h e r ef+5, 5 F is chosen to maximize
+4,X3 . +5,+y+5>|+5,, . w+5,,
subject to LF+4, and LU+5,. A solution exists by (A.1)-(A.2), where by optimality Y +5>f+5,, @ Y U+5,. Denote
the realized utility by X+,.
Claim 2. X+, is continuous.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of continuity of XS+,. Q.E.D.
We define next an auxiliary fixed-point problem which is used below. Given +I> Z,, p , and Y UV+5,,
denote by W+Y U+5,> I> Z>p, the set of all values Y U+4, which satisfy the following conditions:
Y S+4, 5 YS+Y U+4,>YU+5,>, (18)




eIY S+4, . +4  e,Y UV+4,

4  ^4  +4  p,+eI .4 e,`
>
+4  p,eIY S+4,




offer to both types, while given Y S+4,, the value Y U+4, represents the low type’s reservation value if he optimally
chooses between making an acceptable offer of fUV+4, in Z or not. Observe in particular that for I @3the
actual realization of Y S+4, does not enter into (19).
Claim 3. W+, is non-empty, convex, and USC.
Proof. Observe that (19) defines Y U+4, as a nondecreasing and continuous function of Y S+4,, which has a
slope strictly smaller than one. Given the results of Claim 2, existence of a fixed-point and convexity of W+,
follow from a simple graphical argument. Finally, continuity of the expression in (19) and USC of YS+, establish
USC of W+,. Q.E.D.
Fixed-point argument
Recall the definitions of i and j as functions of  and p. Fix now a triple +I> Z>p,, where each element is
restricted to ^3>4`, and calculate the respective values of , j, and i. Define next Y U+5, @ jY UV+5,. We define
now a mapping * =^ 3 >4`
6 $ ^3>4`
6 i nas e r i e so fs t e p s .
- Take some Y U+4, 5 W+Y U+5,> I> Z>p,. Note next that the choice of Y U+4, also defines uniquely a
value XS+Y U+4,>YU+5,>, and a value X+Y U+4,>YU+5,>,.
- Keeping +I> Z>p, fixed, define for any choice of Y U+4, the set a *+I> Z>p>YU+4,, of all triples
+a 
I>a 
Z> a p,, which simultaneously satisfy the following three conditions:










a p @4 otherwise.
77 Observe that FS+, may not be convex. For this reason we allow firms to randomize so as to realize any (ex-
pected)utilityintheconvexsetYS+,. Alternatively,itcanbecheckedthat(A.1)-(A.2)togetherwithg5y+m>|,@g|5 








3 if X+, AX S+,










3 if Y UV+4, ?YU+4,
4 Y UV+4, AYU+4,
5 ^3>4` Y UV+4, @ Y U+4,
(22)





By convexity of W+, and continuity of XS+, and X+,, *+, is convex. We show next that it is also USC in
+I> Z>p,. This follows again from continuity of XS+, and X+, and from USC of W+,.
ByapplyingKakutani’stheorem,theequation+I> Z>p, 5 *+I> Z>p,hasthusafixed-point. Wechoose
one for given  and denote the respective values by I
 , Z
 ,a n dp. Observe that with this choice we have also





Properties for high 
The fixed-point result so far neither implies existence of an equilibrium, nor that the asserted characteristics
are satisfied. This will follow for high  from a series of claims.
Claim 4. It holds that i $ 4.
Proof. We argue by contradiction, which implies existence of a subsequence where iq $  i?4. Take the
original sequence as the subsequence and observe that this implies existence of some a 3 ? 4 such that p ? 4
for all Aa 3, while also j $ 4. By construction this implies next that Y U
 +5, $ Y UV+5,, while from (19) a
lower boundary for Y U
 +4, converges to Y UV+4,. To obtain a contradiction, we derive next a series of implications
following from the assumption that i $  i?4.
We claim first that there exist  %4 A 3>a 4 ? 4 such that for Aa 4 it holds that +5, A  %4,w h i l ea l s oI
 A 3.
To see that this holds, recall first that (20) is solved by some p ? 4 for all Aa 3.B y X3 A 3 and  i?4,
firms must realize strictly more than X3 in I, which by construction of fUV+4, and the property of Y U
 +4, can
only be the case with the high type, implying indeed that +5, must remain bounded away from zero. In case the
claim for I
 does not hold, we can select a subsequence of high values q where I
q @3 , implying from (19)
that Y U
q+4, $ Y UV+4,. By construction of the RS family of contracts this ensures that X

 $ X3 such that (20)
cannot be satisfied. Hence, we have shown that +5, A  %4,w h i l ea l s oI
 A 3 holds for Aa 4.
We claim next that there exist  %5 A 3>a 5 ? 4 such that for Aa 5 it holds that Y S
 +4, AYUV+4, .  %5.T o
see this, recall first that for Aa 4 it holds from I
 A 3 that iXS
 @ X3.B yi $  i?4, the properties of
Y U
 +l,, and construction of fUV+4,, this can only be the case if |UV+5, A| +5, and contracts for l @5in I
are sufficiently less distorted. The assertion Y S
 +4, AY UV+4, .  %5 follows then immediately from (A.2) and
incentive compatibility for l @4 .
We claim next that there exist  %6 A 3>a 6 ? 4 such that for Aa 6 it holds that I
 A  %6.B y +5, A  %4
for Aa 4 this is indeed the case if we can show that Z
 @3holds for sufficiently high values of , which
32would follow from (22) in case Y U
 +4, AY UV+4,. T op r o v et h el a s ta s s e r t i o nw ea r g u et oac o n t r a d i c t i o na n d
assume that this does not hold for high  along some subsequence. By Y S
q+4, AYUV+4, .  %5 for q A a 5 and
jq $ 4, this implies I
q $ 3, such that for high  it follows from (21) that iqX

q @ X3.B yY U
q+4,  Y UV+4,,
iq $  i?4, and X3 A 3 this leads again to a contradiction given the construction of fUV+5,. Hence, we have
shown that Y U
 +4, AYUV+4, must hold for high , implying I
 A  %6.
We are now in a position to complete the proof of Claim 4. Given I
 A  %6 and Y S





,w ek n o wf r o mj $ 4thatY U
 +4,Y S
 +4, $ 3. Wecannextapplyanargumentasusedrepeatedly
intheproofofProposition1. ByconstructionoffUV+4,wecanconcludefromY S
 +4, AYUV+4,. %5 thatthefirm
realizesastrictlynegativeutilitywithl @4 .A s+4, A 3+4,holdsbyconstructionandasY U
 +4,Y S
 +4, $ 3,
it follows from (A.2) that firms are strictly better off for high  by restricting an offer to l @5 . Formally, we can
find some a 7 ? 4 such that for Aa 7 it holds that X

 AX S
 .45 For Ap d {
q
a 3>a 4>a 5>a 6>a 7
r
we have




 A 3 contradict (22). By contradiction we have therefore
established that i $ 4. Q.E.D.
Claim 5. There exist %A3,  4 ? 4 such that for A 4 it holds that +4, ? 4  %.
Proof. We argue to a contradiction and assume existence of a subsequence where q+4, $ 4.T a k e t h e
original sequence as the subsequence. From (17) this implies Z
 ? 4 for high , which by (22) is only the case
if Y U
 +4,  Y UV+4,. For this to hold, however, it must be the case that I
 A 3 and that Y S
 +4, AYU
 +4,, i.e.
that LU+4, is not binding in a solution to S+, for high . By optimality this implies that LF+4, binds and that
the respective value of the sorting variable specified for the high type, which we denote by |+5,,i sc h o s e nt o
maximize +5,v+5>| +5,, . +4,^y+5>| +5,,  y+4>| +5,,`. By (A.2) this implies |+5, $4as +4, $ 4,
which yields for high  a contradiction to Y S
 +4, AYU
 +4,. This proves the assertion. Q.E.D.
Claim 6. There exist pE ? 4>  5 ? 4 such that for A 5 it holds that p ?p E.
Proof. We argue to a contradiction and assume existence of a subsequence where pq $ 4. Take the orig-
inal sequence as the subsequence. Consider the strategy for firms to offer in I only a contract to l @5 .B y
specifying | @ |UV+5, and w @ Y U
 +5,  Y +5>|UV+5,,, incentive compatibility for l @4is ensured due
to Y U
 +4,  jY UV+4, and Y U
 +5, @ jY UV+5,. As firms must not receive more than X3 under this strat-
egy due the requirement (20), it must hold that X3  i^+4,X3 . +5,+v+5>|UV+5,,  Y U
 +5,,, which by











4  +4  ep,
4  +4  +4  e,+4  p,,
grows beyond any boundary as  $ 4.A s+5, remains bounded away from zero by Claim 5 and as i $ 4 by
Claim 4, this contradicts (23). Hence, p must indeed be bounded away from one for sufficiently high values of
. Q.E.D.
We are finally in a position to complete the existence proof. By Claim 6 it follows that j $ 4, implying from
78 Recall that Y S
 +4, may be the expected outcome if firms randomize. In this case the argument holds for all
offers realizing for low types not less than the expected value Y S
 +4,.
33Y U
 +l,  jY UV+l, for l 5 L that entry is indeed optimal for A 6 and some  6 ? 4. Observe next that by




@ X3. Recall also that we have ensured by
construction that firms make an optimal choice in I, while the same holds for the decision of low types to break
up a match in Z. By specifying pessimistic beliefs we ensure that offers in Z are optimal.
It thus remains to show that the high type’s incentive compatibility constraint, which was neglected in S+,,
holds for high . To see this, note first that Y U
 +l, $ Y UV+l,, which indeed ensures that Y U
 +5, AY U
 +4, .
y+5>|+4,,  y+4>|+4,, holds for A 6 and some  7 ? 4. Existence of an equilibrium is thus ensured for all
A  @ pd{
 4> 5> 6> 7

.
ByClaim4theconstructedsequencealsosatisfies i $ 4. Itthusremainstoshowthat themeasureofworkers
remains bounded. By (17) we obtain that +4  e,Z
 . eI
 is equal to ^3+4,+4  +4,,`@^+4,3+5,`, which
by +4, ? 4  % due to Claim 5 remains for A  strictly bounded from below by some value  A3. As also
p ?p E for A  due to Claim 6, stocks are bounded from above by Z+5,   Z+5, @ HZ+5,@+4  pE,
and Z+4,   Z+4, @ HZ+4,@^+4  pE, `. Choosing P @  Z+4, .  Z+5, completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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